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ABSTRACT:  
In the literature on the turn to the left in the wider Latin American region, Central 
America has generally been neglected. The aimof this article is to seek to fill that gap, 
while specifically assessing the left turn’s impact on prospects for democratization in 
the sub-region. Using three case studies – El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua – the 
article questions the usefulness of transition theory for analysis and instead offers a 
framework based on state/civil society interaction within the context of globalization. 
Four key conclusions are made: First, democratization is not a linear process, but can 
be subject to simultaneous processes of democratization and de-democratization. 
Second, continued deep structural inequalities remain central to the region’s politics 
but these often provoke unproductive personalistic and partisan politics which can 
inhibit or curtail democratization. Third, interference from local and/or international 
economic actors can curtail or reverse democratization measures, underlining the 
influence of globalization. Fourth, Central America is particularly revelatory of these 
tendencies due to its acute exposure to extreme oligarchic power and outside 
influence. It hence can help shed light on wider questions on the blurring of 
boundaries between state, civil society and market and its impact on democratization, 
especially within the context of globalization. In this way the article contributes to the 
analysis of Central America in the current context of the ‘pink tide’, underlines the 
importance of continued analysis of Central America for democratization studies, and 
brings new insight to debates on transition theory.. 
 
Keywords: Central America; El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua; pink tide; left; 
democratisation; transition theory 
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Introduction 
In recent years the emergence of left and left of centre governments in Latin America 
–the so-called ‘pink tide’ - has been attracting much academic attention.2 It is 
surprising, however, that little of this literature places the phenomenon within 
democratisation theory, particularly ‘transitology’, which held great sway over much 
political science analysis of Latin America in preceding years.3  Furthermore, most of 
the literature on the ‘pink tide’ has understandably concentrated on South America, 
where the most notable left governments have emerged. Little attention has been paid 
to Central America, despite the fact that that this region was the centre of intense 
activity by the revolutionary left in the 1980s, and an intense right wing counter-
offensive in the context of the Cold War, resulting in devastating civil conflicts. 
Furthermore, it was subject to one of the first comprehensive international peace 
building processes in the post Cold War era, including internationally supported 
democratisation programmes.4  Finally with the elections of Daniel Ortega of the 
revolutionary Sandinista movement (FSLN) in Nicaragua (2007); Mauricio Funes of 
the erstwhile left guerrilla movement, FMLN (Faribundo Martí Front for National 
Liberation) in El Salvador (2009); and, the social democratic Álvaro Colom in 
Guatemala (2008), Central America has not been immune to the ‘pink tide’ sweeping 
the wider region. The 2009 coup against left leaning Manuel Zelaya in Honduras 
further signals the region’s importance for understanding the backlash to broader pink 
tide politics in the context of democratisation, and as we argue here, de-
democratisation processes.  
The paper is based on three case studies– El Salvador, Honduras and 
Nicaragua.5  It begins by offering a critical review of transition theory in order to 
foreground the importance of a relational analysis of civil society and the state for 
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understanding processes of both democratisation and de-democratisation. This 
analysis concludes that it is necessary not only to take account of who controls the 
state, but also to analyse who constitutes civil society and what impact the existing 
correlation of forces within civil society has had on the state and its actions. These 
findings must be put within the context of globalisation – understood here as 
neoliberalism and its associated institutions - in order to accurately assess the impact 
on democratisation or de-democratisation processes on the polity under study.. This 
analytical framework is then used to argue that democratisation is not a linear process, 
but is subject to processes of de-democratisation.  Historic continuities within Central 
America, namely the continued presence of deep structural inequalities remain central 
to the region’s politics, but we argue these struggles are frequently sidetracked into 
unproductive personalistic and partisan politics. These findings open up wider 
questions about the blurring of boundaries between state, civil society and market and 
its impact on democratisation, especially within the current context of globalised 
neoliberal socio-economic structures. In this way the paper not only seeks to 
emphasise the importance of continued analysis of Central America for 
democratisation studies, but also to make an important contribution to debate on 
democratisation theory and its continued usefulness for political analysis globally.  
 
Democratisation theory and the role of civil society 
While Grugel identifies a number of distinct types of democratisation theory, it was 
transition theory, or ‘transitology’ which dominated the field in the 1980s, particularly 
with reference to Latin America. ‘Transitology’ sees democratisation as a process, led 
by cost-benefit calculations on the part of key actors. As such it has been subject to 
two major critiques. First, the very concepts of ‘transition’ and ‘democratisation’ were 
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held to be inherently teleological in their assumptions, with a pronounced 
‘eurocentric’ bias in what was deemed to be the ultimate democratic end-point. 
Second, ‘transitologists’ concentrated on elite bargaining and procedural and 
institutional definitions of democracy, leading to difficulties in explaining the varying 
outcomes of democratisation processes, resulting in conceptual stretching by 
analysts.6  
In answer to the first critique on teleology, three points have been raised. First, 
democratisation needs to be viewed within a wide-angle, long term analytical 
perspective, perhaps from when it was first conceived in Ancient Greece, but certainly 
since the Enlightenment.7 Second, democratisation is not a uni-directional process, 
but rather polities can experience periods of democratisation and de-democratisation, 
that is the ‘expansion and contraction of popular rule’.8 Third, all real or concrete 
political systems – be they established ‘democracies’ in the ‘West’ or ‘authoritarian’ 
regimes elsewhere – ‘exhibit to greater or lesser degrees democratic and autocratic 
traits’.9 This also undermines the notion that the ‘West’ can act as a yardstick against 
which other regimes are measured. Hence, the end result of democratisation processes 
is not ‘democracy’ as established in the ‘West’, which is equally subject to such 
processes. To echo Barrett et al., ‘it may be more appropriate to speak of 
democratisation as an ongoing, dynamic process than of democracy as a final end 
state’ (emphasis in original).10  
In answer to the second major critique of concentration on elite actions leading 
to problems in explaining outcomes, Grugel recommends focussing on the interaction 
between state and civil society within the context of globalization.  First, for 
democratisation to occur the state has to undergo ‘a substantive transformation in its 
operations and its representativeness’, to give it the capacity to deliver ‘better, more 
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secure lives’ for citizens.11 Second, a shift in the power balance in civil society must 
take place to facilitate this transformation of the state. Finally, attention must be paid 
to globalization’s impact on these processes in each state.12 All these three factors will 
have impact on the depth and quality of different democratisation processes. She 
hence deals with the problem of structure, on the national and global levels, in 
explaining outcomes. 
Grugel’s framework points to the general agreement found in the literature on 
the centrality of civil society in democratisation processes, yet civil society itself is a 
contested concept. We argue here that the particularities of this empirical contestation 
over who or what is civil society can offer important insights into democratisation 
processes. Analyses of civil society can be grouped into four perspectives. First, 
liberal perspectives see civil society as separate from state and market, having a 
watchdog role towards the former and an unproblematised relationship with the 
latter.13 Second, an ‘alternative’ neo-gramscian perspective, emerging from sectors of 
civil society, sees it as a realm of struggle riven by inequalities, aimed at transforming 
the state to benefit the less privileged.14 Third, both these neglect what has been called 
an ‘uncivil society’ of criminal or clandestine groups such as gangs, terrorist 
organisations, or racist or xenophobic groups, amongst others.15 This is particularly 
resonant in contemporary Central America, where levels of criminality and violence 
among non-state actors are among the highest in the world. Fourth, and finally, some 
put forward a perspective denying the validity of civil society as an explanatory 
concept16 or from a more Marxist perspective, questioning its separation from the 
state17 or from the state and the market.18 Indeed Meiksins Wood questions the liberal 
dichotomy of the state as an agent of oppression and civil society that of liberation. 
For her civil society – which includes the market – is the ‘privatization of public 
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power’19 and hence both it and the state are subsumed in the over-arching and limiting 
structures of globalisation and its interactions with the politics of regional and 
national capital.  
Pearce helps locate the roots of some of these perspectives in Latin America in 
an exploration of the trajectory of democratisation since independence, She identifies 
a bifurcated republican identity in Latin America, between classic liberal 
republicanism inspired by a belief in individual liberty and a Rousseaunian radical 
republicanism based on belief in the ‘common good’. Struggles between these two 
types of republicanism shaped the contours of both state and civil society in the region 
throughout post-colonial Latin American history.  From elite based civil society 
organisations of the nineteenth century to the top-down inclusion of popular sectors 
during the populist era; the authoritarian counter-revolution of the 1970s, with its 
attempted eradication of progressive civil society groups; the renaissance of social 
movements emerging in reaction to this repression; and, the rebirth of ‘civil society’ 
as a concept in the democratic transitions of the 1980s; in each of these eras distinct 
groups were favoured over others by national states – and by foreign states through 
development cooperation or other aid - as the ‘actually existing civil society’.20  
Pearce’s account indicates a number of important points useful in the 
construction of an interpretative framework for examining civil society/state 
interaction within democratisation. First, it reaffirms the centrality of civil society to 
democratisation processes and points to the long term nature of those processes. 
Second, it reveals the influence of ideology on conceptions of civil society, with both 
forms of republicanism present in Latin America shaping differing conceptions of it 
and thus its relations with the state and market. Third, it points to the role of the state 
in privileging certain groups over others – creating an ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ 
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dynamic - as the operative, empirical ‘civil society’ of that era. Hence, the political 
context – internationally as well as domestically - can denominate which social 
sectors are recognised officially as constituting civil society – and which are not. In 
other words who constitutes civil society vis á vis the state is not a given but a result 
of deliberate policy.  
Pearce’s account indicates how the conception and constitution of civil society 
in any given polity is shaped by the ideology, power configuration, class sectors and 
political context dominant in that polity. ‘Civil society’ therefore is not a fixed entity, 
with established permanent features, but rather an ‘empty signifier’ over which 
struggles take place amongst the contending social forces for its appropriation and 
definition. Actually existing ‘civil society’ is formed dialectically by the struggles 
between these different social, political and institutional forces. As Robert Cox 
contends: ‘Any fixed definition of the content of the concept ‘civil society’ would just 
freeze a particular moment in history and privilege the relations of social forces then 
prevailing’.21 The conception and constitution of ‘civil society’ is therefore 
historically constructed and attention must be paid to the historical context in any 
assessment of its constitution, a theme we draw out here.  
To sum up, democratisation must not be seen as a uni-linear process but rather 
as a constant, even daily struggle between democratizing and de-democratizing 
tendencies. Imperative to this is the need to place democratisation processes within 
the wider socioeconomic and structural contexts of neoliberal globalization, paying 
specific attention to the interaction between the state, civil society and the market.  
Civil society, therefore, cannot be seen as a fixed entity, but one which is shaped by 
struggles between contending social forces at specific historical conjunctures.  
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This discussion allows us to identify five key questions to guide any 
examination of democratisation processes. First, who controls the state? Second, who 
constitutes civil society in this context? Third, has there been a shift in the power 
balance within civil society and what impact has this had on the state? Fourth, what 
influence has globalisation had on these processes? Fifth and finally, have these 
processes resulted in increased democratisation or de-democratisation? In the next 
section we analyse the so-called ‘pink tide’ in Latin America within this framework 
and ask what impact it has had on democratisation processes in the region, before 
going on to look more specifically at the situation in our three Central American case 
studies.   
 
Democratisation, civil society/state relations and the emergence of the ‘pink tide’ 
in Latin America  
The emergence of the ‘pink tide’ has been located in the failures of neoliberalism to 
deliver its promise of prosperity, with a concurrent ‘democratic disillusion’ towards 
the political system which promoted it. This rejection of neoliberalism was led by 
social movements which formed and found their voice during the neoliberal era, 
enriching and revitalising the left and sidelining the old social democratic parties, who 
were often responsible for the introduction and implementation of neoliberal policy. 
Among the unifying characteristics of the new left governments which emerged from 
this dynamic, is a more pronounced search for equality to counteract the perceived 
increase in inequality and poverty left by neoliberalism in the region.22 This is 
pursued in two principal ways: through democratic innovation and a policy agenda 
that seeks to lessen social inequality.  
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  In the current context of ‘pink tide’ Latin America, civil society is 
increasingly conceived of as social movements (women, environmentalists, anti-
globalisation activists, indigenous groups etc.). These social movements emerged as 
the chief counterbalance to the ‘social forces of oppression’ and are identified as ‘the 
primary impetus for social and political change’.23This potential for change can best 
be realised through the adoption of participatory democracy, which is seen as a 
‘convergence between the deepening of democracy and…the revitalisation of civil 
society and its articulation with the state’.24 As the key attribute of the state is seen as 
its capacity to intervene in social and economic relations, it is thus viewed as a 
‘strategic terrain’ upon which contending social and political forces struggle in order 
to realise their strategies.25 Social movements thus can transcend the narrow role 
assigned to civil society in liberal theory, aiming to transform the state both by 
redirecting its modes of intervention (in order to lessen social and economic 
inequalities and thus alter the balance of social forces) and transforming its forms of 
representation (in order to make it more accessible and thus more susceptible to 
pressure from below). Hence, the relationship between civil society (conceived of as 
social movements) and the state ‘should be understood as a dialectical one’.26 
 Nonetheless, as many of the new left governments matured in power, this 
promise of a renewed contract between civil society and the state did not always 
materialise.27 Boron offers three reasons for this. First and notable for our cases, the 
increased power of markets and their ‘capacity for blackmail’ (capital flight, 
investment strikes etc.) against governments which may introduce policies seen as 
detrimental to market interests. Second, ‘the persistence of imperialism’, either 
through conditionalites imposed in return for debt readjustment by the multilateral 
financial agencies and/or direct political demands from the United States such as the 
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‘war on drugs’ and bilateral aid systems. Both are policed through ‘the ideological 
manipulation made possible by big capital’s almost exclusive control of the mass 
media, the creators of the ‘common sense’ of our times’. Third, the devaluation of 
democracy in the preceding decades weakened the state’s ‘capacities for intervention 
in social life’28, further exacerbated by the many historical weaknesses of the state in 
Latin America.29 Additionally many Latin American left governments have pursued a 
development model which privileges resource extraction, bringing it into conflict with 
many social movements, such as environmentalist and indigenous groups in 
particular, despite revenue from these being used, in some cases, to satisfy social 
demands. 30All these factors seriously circumscribe the room for manoeuvre of the 
new left governments to deliver on their promises, causing disillusion and 
estrangement amongst many of the social movements which had brought them to 
power and impairing the prospects for the ‘new deal’ between state and civil society 
to consolidate itself.   
 To summarise, returning to our framework above, we find in the new left 
governments of Latin America, to greater or lesser degrees, on a local and/or national 
level, an attempt to reorient state/civil society relations by facilitating greater civil 
society influence over policy making processes. Many of these governments, 
rhetorically or more practically, privilege certain social movements as the ‘actually 
existing’ civil society. This interaction between social movements and government 
has resulted in a greater emphasis being placed on social policy directed at lessening 
poverty and inequality. This re-orientation of policy, however, is severely 
circumscribed by the influence of neoliberalism, at the international and national 
level, impairing its effectiveness and sowing distrust amongst the very social 
movements who were instrumental in creating the conditions for the left to gain 
 13 
power in the region. In other words the desired state/civil society alliance to advance 
equality and control the market is not emerging, primarily as a result of national and 
regional capital interests strengthened by globalisation processes.  
While in this section we looked at the situation on state/civil society relations 
within Latin America in general, how has Central America been faring in the current 
context? The next section will examine these relations in Central America in historical 
context, concentrating specifically on the paper’s three case studies: El Salvador, 
Nicaragua and Honduras, before examining empirical evidence from fieldwork in 
2009-10.  In the conclusion, we will evaluate the implications of these findings on 
democratisation theory and practice.  
 
Democratisation processes in El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua in historical 
perspective 
Following independence, liberal reform in Central America sought to break up 
traditional socioeconomic structures inherited from the colonial era and transform the 
state in order to facilitate an export oriented economy based on agricultural 
commodities.31 In El Salvador this resulted in the development of a unified national 
bourgeoisie with strong institutions that were subservient to its needs. In Nicaragua 
and Honduras, local elites remained divided and the state weak, with episodes of US 
intervention in both. Each of the countries as a result developed different political 
regimes with different patterns of state/society relations. El Salvador developed 
sharply polarised military-authoritarian regimes used managed elections and ample 
coercion to control and suppress dissent with the full cooperation of economic elites. 
In Nicaragua and Honduras, traditional dictatorships developed, based on patronage 
and clientelism, with a limited use of coercion and ample corruption. In Nicaragua the 
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state was dominated by the US backed Somoza clan, while in Honduras it was led by 
military personnel, again supported by the US, but with individual rather than 
institutional rule. In each state civil society was limited to bourgeois elites, with 
occasional reform gestures made to trade unions and peasant groups.  
This situation changed substantially in the 1970s and 1980s. In Nicaragua in 
1979 the popular, socialist Sandinista government swept away the Samoza clan in 
power since 1932. This led to a long period of war against the US supported and 
funded contras, which finally resulted in the Sandinistas losing power in the 1990 
elections to a US-supported conservative coalition. In El Salvador the existing 
military-bureaucratic regime was replaced in 1979 with a non-democratic, civilian 
regime with heavy support, both military and otherwise, from the United States, in 
order to pursue the war against the revolutionary forces of the FMLN. Finally, in 
Honduras the dictatorial regime in power from 1932 was replaced in a managed 
transition to civilian, party rule in 1982. Honduras, however, was also used as a base 
for US counter-revolutionary campaigns in El Salvador and Nicaragua thus, the 
military remained a powerful institution in Honduran politics until the 1990s.   
The path to peace was finally sealed in 1987 with the Esquipulas II 
agreement,32 The wars had devastating impacts on Central America with 300,000 
killed, 2 million refugees and an already weak social and economic infrastructure 
destroyed. In response, the international community launched a large and complex 
peace-building strategy in Central America, with democratisation processes at its 
centre.33 Despite massive international investment, what resulted, however, were ‘low 
intensity democracies’, which go little beyond electoralism. 34 In all three countries 
elite domination continues of much of the economic and political infrastructure. The 
public in general suffers from a ‘democratic disillusion’, due to such factionalism and 
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the inability of the state to solve problems of inequality, poverty and injustice.35 
Although El Salvador and Nicaragua have strong civil society organisations, 
emerging from the disbanded revolutionary movements, these were frozen out of 
policy making by the right wing governments in both states and in the case of 
Nicaragua, many continue to be excluded by the current government of Daniel 
Ortega.  
Arising partially from this situation are high levels of crime and violence,, 
further compromising state capacity in each of the three countries. Jenny Pearce has 
argued that this context of criminality is closely linked to the development of the state 
in the region, notably its subservient relationship to elite interests. She suggests that 
we should be aware of the ways in which states enable violence whether this is 
through direct involvement in criminal networks, incapacity, complicity, omission and 
economic policies that further exacerbate inequalities. Her argument is based on the 
contention that a historic ‘perverse state formation’ took place in Latin America, 
dedicated to the preservation of elite rule, and through which ‘categories of people are 
“sacrificed”’ to become non citizens, notably those who are victims of violence from 
both state and non-state actors. This arrangement of power has not changed 
significantly with democratization.36 Despite rising citizen preoccupation with 
security in the region, state response has been weak. Notably, increased criminality 
provides economic opportunities, both legal and illegal. Key political actors in the 
region have economic interests in this fast growing market for the provision of private 
security and the provision of arms, but also some of the more illicit acts such as 
money laundering and drugs.37  
This is amply illustrated in the case of Central America. The northern triangle 
of the isthmus has amongst the highest homicide rates in the world. In 2008 El 
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Salvador (52 people murdered out of 100,000) and Honduras (58/100,000) far 
surpassed the Latin American average (25/100,000 in 2006), while Nicaragua 
remained well below it (13/100,000 in 2008) (PNUD, 2010: 68-69). 38 Many of these 
murders, as with much crime in the region, are drug related, due to Central America 
becoming a crucial transport route for drugs from the (Andean) producing to the 
(North American and European) consuming countries. Large, criminal and competing 
transnational gangs have developed to manage this lucrative trade, with the financial 
sector at a national and regional level becoming involved to facilitate money 
laundering, and with local youth gangs becoming involved at a micro-level in terms of 
distribution and other tasks. . 
This huge growth in criminality in the region has had a debilitating effect on 
Central American states on a number of levels. As crime has increased so has citizen 
insecurity, yet the police and justice system are incapable of responding effectively to 
the challenge, and indeed heavy handed policies employed throughout the region to 
target youth gangs have merely exacerbated the problem by allowing other types of 
crime to flourish.39 Corruption has become widespread, both on a petty, daily basis 
but also at the highest level of state, with state/criminal relations becoming 
increasingly institutionalised allowing ‘money laundering, control of local state 
apparatus, buying of police and judicial authorities and political parties or candidates 
in need of funding’.40 This can reach such levels that not only does criminality subvert 
the state, it can even replace it,, developing, in some areas, into ‘parallel states with 
their own economic, social, and political regulatory systems’.41 Hence the very 
weakness of the state, exacerbated by globalisation, has allowed such criminal activity 
to grow, while simultaneously being weakened further by it.  
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In sum, building on our framework above, the state in each of the three 
countries has not experienced a transformation near enough sufficient to deliver 
‘better, more secure lives’ to its citizens.42 Nor, has a transformation taken place in 
the power balance in civil society with elites remaining in control of key state 
institutions and the state favouring an elitist, as against a popularly based, ‘civil 
society’. Meanwhile, globalization, in the form of neoliberal restructuring has further 
favoured those elites. They have benefitted from the privatization of public assets and 
free trade agreements, while poverty and inequality remain static or have deepened, 
adversely affecting lower and some middle sectors. The pervasiveness of criminality 
has subverted the state at a national level and even replacing it in some local areas. 
Democratisation therefore at the very least has advanced little beyond electoral 
formalism and has brought few substantive benefits to the ‘have less’, thus retarding 
that possibility even further. What, if anything has changed with the arrival of left or 
left of centre governments to power in each of these three countries?  
 
El Salvador’s turn to the left: challenges to re-democratisation? 
Democratization in El Salvador coincided with an aggressive neoliberalism developed 
by the right wing party, ARENA, that held power from 1989-2009. Throughout 
ARENA’s twenty year tenure, state institutions were widely perceived to serve the 
interests of a minority and closely linked to party objectives. 43 Likewise, civil society 
was restricted to a few organisations whose ideology was acceptable to the interests of 
capital, such as Salvadoran Foundation for Economic and Social Development 
(FUSADES) and the National Association of Private Enterprise (ANEP). Other civil 
society organisations with arguably more progressive agendas, many of which had 
grown out of the FMLN guerrilla movement, were firmly excluded and formed an 
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unofficial opposition often in conjunction, though not always in agreement, with the 
FMLN. This not only led to charges of a weak state, political exclusion and 
polarisation, but also of electoral authoritarianism since the state was widely 
perceived to protect minority interests rather than the provide public services.44   
The swearing-in of Mauricio Funes leading an FMLN government on June 1, 
2009 challenged this hegemony and provided a real ‘test’ to both the procedures and 
substance of democracy in El Salvador.45 In his inauguration speech, Funes promised 
a government of national unity and has made a pragmatic effort to reach across 
historic party lines.46  A Social and Economic Council was set up to guide state 
policy, led by a chief government advisor, Alex Segovia Cacerés, with broad NGO 
and private sector participation. The Funes government has included important elite 
families as backers and/or state appointees, a move that has heralded criticism from 
the ranks of the FMLN.47 The aim of this strategy was to include more ‘progressive’ 
elements of the traditional Salvadoran oligarchy in a pluralistic, modernising 
government thus increasing its room for policy manoeuvre while not entirely 
alienating local elites and their international allies.48 Hence, civil society, which 
previously was associated with NGOs related to ARENA and business interests, has 
now became more pluralistic with representation from those NGOs traditionally 
associated with the FMLN and ‘progressive’ elements of the traditional oligarchy.  
This has led to a cautious shift in the power balance within civil society. 
Although civil society groups previously shut out from policy making now feel some 
opening, new structures such as the Social and Economic Council have had little 
direct policy impact.49 These strategies have also opened up breaches within the 
FMLN movement, with the Funes government seen as hesitant, and the links to 
bourgeois elites viewed with suspicion. Polarisation also reinforces previous patterns 
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endemic in state structures, namely the state appointments dictated by party loyalty, 
something which is equally prevalent in civil society.  
This partisan polarisation of the Salvadoran state points to the historic blurring 
of boundaries between civil society, political parties and state institutions. Moreover, 
it points to the highly exclusionary nature of these bodies. Several leaders from NGOs 
and academics historically associated with the FMLN took up posts in the new 
government, although the massive sacking of personnel that usually follows a change 
in government did not occur. Many state institutions remain dominated by 
functionaries appointed by the previous ARENA administration, due to a belated 
introduction of a labour stability law for government functionaries one month before 
Funes was sworn in, an act that was widely seen as an attempt for ARENA to ensure 
its continued control of the state apparatus.50 On taking up office, the Funes 
government found that several state institutions had spent large parts of their budgets 
before the change of government, a prevalence of ‘ghost’ projects that did not exist 
yet cost the national purse millions of dollars and ‘ghost’ staff who failed to show up 
to work, but received payment.51 This is indicative of high levels of corruption and 
more pertinent to our analysis, of political manoeuvring that puts minority interests 
before effective governance. Squabbles within government departments between old 
functionaries and new appointees hinder reform.  
The effects on the former incumbents have been both of retrenchment and 
internal division. Taking advantage of increased levels of criminal violence, historic 
right wing groups such as ARENA, ANEP and the Chamber of Commerce charge 
Funes government of ‘ungovernability’ and ‘lawlessness’.52 Thinly veiled warnings 
from key ARENA figures such as former President Alfredo Cristiani indicate they 
would do whatever it took to protect their ‘system of freedoms’.53 This highlights 
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threats to Funes’ limited space in which to manoeuvre and also points to the 
determination of the right to protect their ‘system of freedoms’ over democratic 
values (a theme that is discussed in more detail in the Honduras case). Nonetheless, 
the position of the right has weakened following the electoral defeat. In late 2009, a 
new party, GANA, was formed, weakening ARENA’s position in the Legislative 
Assembly.54 
Continuity is also evident at the international level. With its dollarized 
economy, its membership of the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) 
with the US, and its huge population of migrants, El Salvador is highly globalized. 
This limits reform possibilities, for fear of response from the US and local 
transnationlised elites. The impact of this can be seen also at a regional level in its 
relationship with other ‘pink tide’ governments. Funes has distanced himself from 
Venezuela, despite many local FMLN administrations having links to ALBA. He has 
also expressed support for the Porfirio Lobo administration in Honduras even though 
many Latin American countries, including Brazil have refused to recognise his 
legitimacy.  
These factors provide positive and negative indications for democratisation in 
El Salvador. On the positive side, increased inclusion of previously excluded civil 
society groups in policy making structures has opened up possibilities for progressive, 
inclusive measures to further democratisation processes. On the negative side, the 
continued patterns of polarisation along party lines of many civil society and state 
institutions (at national and local levels), and the predominant influence of market 
oriented ideology and US influence, seriously inhibit possibilities of democratising 
policies. In this context, the fluidity between civil society, parties and the state 
reinforce that these cannot be analysed as neatly autonomous due to deep political 
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influences and allegiances and the legacy of a state that has been built on the interests 
of a narrow minority. 
 
Democracy in crisis: the coup against President Manuel Zelaya in Honduras 
Honduras is perhaps the most dramatic example of de-democratisation in Latin 
America and the site of a violent backlash against ‘pink tide’ politics. In June 2009, 
president Manuel Zelaya Rosales was ousted from office in a coup enacted by 
economic and political elites. To most observers, including the members of the 
Organisations of American States, the EU and huge numbers of Honduran citizens, 
this was a straightforward case of a coup. As the news filtered out, thousands gathered 
to register their shock and dismay at the presidential palace in Tegucigalpa. A de facto 
government was established by Roberto Micheletti, president of the Congress. During 
that period, the official message was clear: a coup had not occurred, rather Zelaya’s 
expulsion was understood a case of constitutional secession of powers with Micheletti 
as ‘interim’ president. Popular protests were brutally repressed and the de facto 
regime defied the international community to remain in power until January 2010. 
Scheduled elections were held in November 2009 which, while severely questioned, 
allowed the installation of Porfirio ‘Pepe’ Lobo of the Nationalist Party as President 
of Honduras on January, 27, 2010. In order to understand this process, it is important 
to trace the controversial presidency of Zelaya. 
Manuel Zelaya (2005-2009) was the epitome of an oligarchic president, 
coming from Honduras’s economic and political elite which like its neighbours is 
dominated by a small number of families who also have key roles in the state.55 
Nonetheless, in the latter two years of his term, Zelaya broke with history and 
attempted to engage with popularly based social movements and NGOs. Examples of 
 22 
actions in this direction were his holding of regular popular assemblies in the 
presidential palace, and implementation of measures seen as hostile to business elite 
interests such as raising the minimum wage by almost 40 per cent in 2009. 56 The 
most contentious proposal, however, was to hold a referendum, at the same time as 
the elections in November 2009, on the installation of a Constituent Assembly to 
redraft the country’s constitution. This was a step too far for the Honduran elite and, 
in their view, firmly allied Zelaya with Hugo Chávez. This was the final straw that led 
to Zelaya’s overthrow on June 28, 2009.57  
After the coup, the Honduran state retrenched firmly to its servile position to 
the oligarchy, while ‘civil society’ became polarised into two main camps. Anti-coup 
groups consist of two main tendencies: those who were originally supporters of the 
president and those who supported the return of the constitutional order, but did not 
necessarily support Zelaya. The social base of these groups consists of indigenous, 
peasants, feminists, progressive sections of the Catholic Church, labour unions, LGBT 
groups etc. Those supporting the coup are business groups, the media, the church 
hierarchy, including the country’s Cardinal Rodriguez, the two main political parties, 
the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Armed Forces, the police and, crucially, the main 
institutions of the state. Mass media campaigns and marches, heavily protected by the 
army and police have framed these groups under a careful rhetoric of national unity 
and claiming to be the true voice of ‘civil society’, calling themselves the ‘whites’, in 
an effort to symbolise peace and purity.58 This stands in stark contrast with media 
portrayals of the anti-coup groups who were dubbed as ‘mobs’ and ‘undesirables’. In 
more than a rhetorical act, these groups have rejected the label ‘civil society’ in 
favour of what they consider the more inclusive terminology of ‘National popular 
resistance movement’ (FNRP).59  
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Social divisions were not a consequence of the coup but were made visible by 
it, both at the national and international level. These fissures are further crossed by 
ideological views of democracy. Pro-coup groups understand democracy as the 
existing institutional configuration that benefits elite interests: order is prioritised over 
Human Rights as the massive repression of social movements since 2009 has 
attested.60 One business leader suggested that this ‘peaceful’ handover of power was 
in fact a ‘great test for Honduran democracy’ and not a coup at all.61 Anti-coup groups 
seek a more inclusive form of democracy, with a more progressive, conception of the 
state and a ‘new social pact’, the central aim of the FNRP.62 Hence, Honduran civil 
society is fractured between those who recognise the current Lobo administration and 
those who reject it, who are active in the FNRP and demand a new social pact. At the 
heart of this struggle is what constitutes ‘democracy’ and whose needs it serves.  
Honduras also illustrates vividly the impact of globalisation in contemporary 
democratisation struggles. Zelaya had taken Honduras into the Venezuelan led ALBA 
initiative in 2008 and many identified the coup as a ‘laboratory’ strategy to defeat the 
advance of that initiative with its close alliance with social movements in the region 
and its rejection of neoliberal conceptions of international cooperation, such as free 
trade agreements. Conservative elements within the US establishment, as well as 
sections of the Miami Cuban and Venezuelan right were said to be advising the coup 
plotters. The close involvement of the United States in brokering agreements on the 
coup underlined Honduras’ political and economic dependence on that state. The 
eventual failure of Zelaya to return permanently to Honduras and the continuance in 
power of the Lobo administration, despite questions around its democratic and hence 
international legitimacy, reinforce this reading’s plausibility.63 
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In Honduras we find both state and civil society as terrains of struggle 
between two contending forces, with differing social bases and holding distinct views 
of what constitutes democracy and democratisation, divisions equally reflected at the 
international level, most notably in the Americas. Whether this conflict will 
eventually result in further democratisation or de-democratisation will depend on the 
outcome of the struggle between the contending forces within Honduras and the 
impact of the international context on that struggle.  
 
 
Nicaragua: Civil Society or ‘Sociedad sí vil’? 64 
Daniel Ortega’ s return to power in January 2007, for the first time since the FSLN’s 
(Sandinista) defeat in elections in 1990, ended 16 years of conservative rule in 
Nicaragua. While the Ortega government claims that it is aiming to restore the social 
advances of the Sandinista revolution (1979-1990) dismantled since its defeat, 
Ortega’s re-election as president has instead seen Nicaragua experience a deepening 
polarisation between the government and the social forces supporting it on the one 
hand, and on the other, many prominent NGOs, much of them historically linked to 
Sandinismo, the media, particularly the print media, and opposition parties. This 
polarisation is cemented around the figure of Daniel Ortega as president and his wife, 
Rosario Murillo.  
This polarisation is also philosophically and ideologically based on different 
conceptions of democracy, with the nature and role of the state, that of civil society 
and their inter-relation central to these differences. The government insists that state 
power must be restored after the damage inflicted on it by neoliberalism, and central 
to this is the restoration of popular power and the re-balancing of state/civil society 
relations. The Ortega led government seeks to achieve the ‘restoration of popular 
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power’, by two principal means – popular participation and social programmes aimed 
at the poorest sectors of society. The main vehicle for the FSLN government to 
establish popular participation is through the Citizen Power Council’s (CPCs), also 
know as Citizen Power Cabinets. CPCs are neighbourhood based committees with the 
officially stated objective of improving local access to services. Civil society in this 
conception, therefore, is about people engaging directly with the state. The second 
element in the restoration of popular power, social programmes, are directly related to 
the first, in that CPCs also administer the flagship government projects, Zero Hunger 
– whereby local women receive farming animals and seeds to allow them to farm on a 
small scale – and Zero Profit, where local people can get access to microloans to start 
small enterprises. CPCs along with the local community identify the people who 
would most benefit from these government schemes, acting in effect as the liaison 
mechanism between the neighbourhood and the state. 
These actions are framed within a wider geopolitical strategy, whereby the 
FSLN government seeks to achieve greater room for manoeuvre for such policy 
experimentation through the establishment of alliances with new international actors, 
while attempting to refrain from overly alienating other key actors with considerable 
power over Nicaragua. Nicaragua has joined the Venezuelan led Petrocaribe and 
ALBA initiatives, allowing it to avail of cheap oil at low credit rates, as well as 
accessing considerable funding for development projects. Equally, Nicaragua has 
formed a close relationship with Russia, leading to a number of preferential deals. 
Nonetheless, it has maintained scrupulously circumspect relations with the IMF, 
ensuring prompt payment of debt, a key issue for this heavily indebted nation, 
although the Ortega government has managed to alienate key donors due to its 
disputes with NGOs.  
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The CPC, however, have been met with scepticism, if not outright, hostility by 
traditional ‘civil society’, mostly NGOs which have been historically aligned with the 
FSLN. After the fall of the Sandinista revolution, the NGO sector expanded 
enormously in Nicaragua, supported by international cooperation funds aimed at 
strengthening ‘civil society’. The arrival of an FSLN government caused splits within 
the NGO community, creating an insider and outsider status in their relations with the 
state. Ortega and the First Lady, Rosario Murillo have attacked NGOs, with the latter 
calling them ‘sociedad sí vil’ – ‘vile society’ -  a play on the Spanish for civil society 
– sociedad civil. Links between NGOs and United States funders associated with 
political meddling in Latin American politics (i.e. USAid and the National 
Endowment of Democracy [NED]) – not least in Nicaragua – have been questioned. 
Furthermore, government officials question NGO claims to representativeness, due to 
their unelected status, unlike government. 65  
While these critiques may be valid with regard to NGOs more generally, they 
must be considered within the conflictual politics of Nicaragua. In 2008 the 
government accused a number of national and international NGOs, including Oxfam 
GB, of money laundering. Feminist organisations in particular were targeted. Many 
believe that this is linked to their opposition to the criminalisation of therapeutic 
abortion and to their support for Ortega’s stepdaughter, Zoilámerica Narvaez, who 
accused him of sexual abuse in the late 1990s.66 The accusations against these 
organisations are thought to have emerged also due to these NGOs being seen as 
competitors with the Frente, and hence the state, both for consciences and for 
resources.  
These developments have had mixed reaction within the NGO sector, ranging 
from vehement opposition to the government, rejection of its behaviour but with a 
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reluctance to enter into conflict, and amongst some sectors active cooperation. The 
most notable reaction, however, has been the first, with many NGOs, supported by the 
media, accusing the government of totalitarianism similar to that of the Somozas, 
pointing to the CPCs in particular as a means to that end.67 This is based on an 
evaluation of the CPCs as sectarian and exclusive in character, inhibiting existing 
organisational models and acting as indoctrination mechanisms. They are seen to 
reduce citizen autonomy of thought and action, occupy increasing numbers of social 
spaces and act as gatekeepers for access to social goods.  
The different interpretations of CPCs are emblematic of the polarised views on 
the Sandinista government led by Daniel Ortega. The government argues that their 
policies are instruments to challenge neoliberalism and replicate historic revolutionary 
structures. Critics argue that the government is in fact neoliberal due to the business 
interests of Ortega and his continued cooperation with international financial 
institutions, including capital. While the government sees its policies as the 
beginnings of a new pact between society and the state, its most ferocious critics see it 
as a totalitarian project aimed at perpetuating Ortega and the FSLN in power. The 
government claims that polarisation is media driven and mostly Managua based but 
many fear that it is so acute that it has caused irreparable damage to the political 
process.68 Poll evidence suggests that polarisation directly affects the Nicaraguan 
public’s trust in both government and civil society. Thus, it is difficult to imagine in 
the current context how these diametrically opposed visions can be reconciled, and 
trust in political elites, and their civil society allies, strengthened.69    
 
Conclusion: the ‘pink tide’ in Central America: democratisation or de-
democratisation?  
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What then do we learn regarding transition theory from these three Central American 
‘pink tide’ case studies? First, we have argued that democratisation can both go 
forward and be subject to setbacks, and this is borne out by evidence from the case 
studies, Honduras being the most notable example. Case studies, however, indicate 
that democratisation and de-democratisation processes do not take place in a linear 
fashion, but rather each case shows co-existing democratising and de-democratising 
tendencies. Second, we emphasise the continued centrality of structural inequalities to 
democratisation struggles in Central America. These should be analysed within the 
heritage of weak states, divided elites and foreign interference, which can and does 
divert such struggles into polarising, personalistic politics with little democratizing 
potential. Here ‘civil society’ is circumstantially defined since the power 
arrangements of each case include and exclude different characterisations of civil 
society. This is key to understanding the ebbs and flows of the political process. The 
partisan links of civil society in El Salvador can open or close political space. In 
Honduras, social movements against the coup reject the label of civil society, while 
the government disqualifies and represses those grouped in the FNRP. The state 
engages only with an ‘official’ civil society of organisations linked to church and 
business sectors. In Nicaragua the contestation over the ‘civil society space’ is played 
out between the state-designated CPCs and those NGOs which are excluded by the 
state and reviled by the presidential couple. All three cases point not only to the 
dialectical nature of state/civil society relations in the face of the impact of capital and 
its effects of poverty and inequality, but to the subordination of the public interest to 
the so-called ‘freedoms’ of a narrow elite.  
This brings up a third issue, related to the level and radicalness of reform and 
the very meaning of democracy. All three cases, with Honduras in particular, point to 
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the limitations on democratizing measures by the threat of interference by local and 
international economic actors, if essential oligarchic interests are jeopardised. In other 
words, market interests circumscribe the actions of the state and weigh heavily on the 
designation of different sectors as ‘civil society’, confirming the porousness of 
boundaries between state, market and civil society. These findings emphasise further 
the limits to the current left projects throughout Latin America within the current 
context of an ideologically weakened but institutionally persistent neoliberal 
governance.  
Finally, the paper highlights the usefulness of studying Central America in this 
respect, since few areas in Latin America have been quite so exposed to the 
combination of extreme oligarchic power and outside interference. This has 
heightened ideological and economic polarisation within these countries, with a 
determining effect on their political processes. As this paper shows, in the context of 
the ‘pink tide’ this can provide valuable data on how these processes can be affected 
negatively by personalised politics and elite interests, the latter further strengthened 
by neoliberalism and globalisation.  
These findings therefore strengthen our position on transition theory as set out 
in the introductory sections. As we stated, two main critiques have been levelled at 
that theory; that it is inherently teleological- and ‘eurocentric’ - in its assumptions, 
and that its concentration on elites and institutions lead to difficulties in explaining 
outcomes in democratisation processes. In response to these critiques and following 
Grugel, we emphasise the need to pay attention to civil society/state interaction on the 
national level, and within the wider context of globalisation.70 Key to this more 
nuanced understanding is our contention that most societies have been subject to both 
democratizing and de-democratizing tendencies within a long term open-ended 
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historical struggle – in other words that democratisation is not a uni-linear process,  
much less one which will terminate in ‘democracy’ as it is assumed to exist in the 
‘West’. This demands an analysis of this struggle within the wider limits of neoliberal 
governance, questioning the conventional liberal separation between state, civil 
society and market. Finally, we stated that while civil society is a central concept to 
help understand democratisation processes it cannot be viewed as a fixed entity but 
one shaped by the contending social forces of a particular historical conjuncture, a 
struggle in which the state has a crucial determining role.  
It is not out intention to argue that democratisation theory is of no analytical 
benefit. Indeed we argue that it is crucial for accurate analysis of political 
developments in Latin America and beyond, but the paper underlines the need for a 
radical re-evaluation of its central tenets. In particular there is a need to depart from 
transition theory and all its teleological implications. We agree with Whitehead 
(2002) that a wide-angled historical and analytical lens is required, rather than the 
usual focus in transition theory on a narrow time scale and sets of actors, but depart 
from the liberal perspective underlying his thesis. We argue instead - moving closer to 
a neo-Gramscian approach - that democratisation theory should centre analysis on 
empirical phenomena arising from class based, open-ended and simultaneous struggle 
within the interlinked terrains of civil society, state and market. With such a renewed 
perspective difficulties such as conceptual stretching and teleological assumptions can 
be avoided, allowing democratisation theory to remain an essential tool for future 
political analysis within the current uncertain global context.  
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